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Abstract
Unionists and politicians frequently claim that globalization lowers employment protection of work-
ers. This paper tests this hypothesis in a panel of 28 OECD countries from 1985 to 2003, differ-
entiating between three dimensions of globalization and two labor market segments. While overall
globalization is shown to loosen protection of the regularly employed, it increases regulation in the
segment of limited-term contracts. We find economic and political globalization to drive deregu-
lation for the regularly employed, while political and social integration appear responsible for the
better protection of workers in atypical employment, outweighing the negative effect of economic
integration. We offer political economy arguments as explanations for these differential effects on
labor market legislation.
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1. Introduction
The question of a harmonization of labor standards is on the agenda of nearly all intergovern-
mental meetings on international trade, be it in the framework of the European Union (EU), the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or the World Trade Organization (WTO). Such
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labor standards comprise workers’ right to form unions, fix maximum number of working hours and
protect against unjustified and mass dismissals – from a producers’ point of view thereby impos-
ing additional production costs and threatening the international competitiveness of their firms.
Consequently, international competition among producers in countries with heterogeneous labor
standards may trigger a race-to-the-bottom (Sinn, 2001; OECD, 2000; ILO, 2009). To prevent such
development, some international organizations, for example the WTO and the International Labour
Organization (ILO), try to set minimum labor standards, but often do not have the necessary legal
means to enforce them (see Krueger, 1996, on the missing enforcement of compulsory schooling laws
to prevent child labor). As described in ILO (2009), the means of international enforcement are
weak as they include only instruments of ‘social dialogues’ and ‘technical assistance’.2 In response,
domestic politicians mainly from the political left typically demand a legally binding harmonization
of labor standards above the minimum level, or argue even against further expansion of free trade.
This paper tests the claim that globalization leads to such a race-to-the-bottom process that
weakens workers’ employment protection. Using a panel on measures of globalization and em-
ployment protection of 28 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) from 1985 to 2003, we find a substantial influence of globalization on em-
ployment protection. A novelty is that this influence is found to differ both across the dimensions
of globalization (economic, political, and social) as well as across the different labor market sectors
(short-term contract and regular-contract workers). While the economic and political dimensions
of globalization are shown to loosen protection of the regularly employed, we find that political
and social globalization tighten the laws regulating the possibility of offering/extending limited-
or short-term contracts, outweighing the opposite effect of economic globalization. We argue that
these differential effects by dimension of globalization and labor market sector are well in line with
recent political economy models of international trade, which have three characteristics: lobbying of
agents (workers, producers), credibility of politicians necessary to fulfill their transmission channel
functions with respect to the agents’ opposing preferences, and the relative economic importance
of the two labor market sectors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next two sections describe previous
mostly empirical literature, illustrates more thoroughly the research gap to be filled, and derives
testable hypotheses that guide our empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the data on globalization,
employment protection and the controlling variables that form part of the empirical model, which
2The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted in 1998 and laid down in several
separate conventions (no. 29, 87, 98, 105, 111, 138), covers only so-called core labor standards, in particular “1)
freedom from forced labor in the form of compulsory labor and slavery, (2) the abolition of exploitative forms of child
labor that put the safety and health of children at significant risk, (3) equal opportunity in employment, and (4)
fundamental union rights like freedom of association and collective bargaining” (Busse, 2004, p.212). Thus, certain
aspects of protection of employment are not covered. The ILO labor standards are summarized and introduced in
ILO (2009).
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is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results for the direct effects of economic,
political and social globalization on workers’ employment conditions, while Section 6 investigates
how political conditions may amplify the pressure exerted by globalization. The findings in this
paper are finally discussed and concluded in Section 7.
2. Previous Literature and Contribution of this Paper
Literature Review
Most theoretical models of international trade such as the ones by Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(1995) and Stern (2003) predict that globalization lowers labor standards due to a race-to-the-
bottom in regulatory competition along the lines of the seminal Tiebout (1956) model.3 As already
argued in the review by Brown (2000), free trade prevents passing the additional production costs
of complying with certain labor standards on to the consumer, who has the possibility to substitute
with cheaper imported goods. Therefore, in open economies these additional production costs have
to be borne by the firms and their workers alone. The race to the bottom of labor standards is
then the outcome of a prisoners’ dilemma game, in which the firm/country that deviates first reaps
excessive profits/welfare gains from trade. However, trade theorists emphasize that such a race
to the bottom does not occur among small open economies – labor standards are then not able
to spill-over across borders – but well in the case of large countries or when small countries have
formed large trading blocks that strategically interact. In the case of the economically advanced
OECD countries, the latter arguments apply.
In contrast to the theoretical models that predict a negative relation between globalization and
labor standards, existing empirical evidence is rather scarce and provides mixed results.4 As argued
below, most empirical models fail to take into account the multifacetedness of globalization, focusing
on foreign trade (‘openness’) and foreign direct investment (FDI) only. Moreover, while some
research on labor market outcomes exists, the impact of globalization on employment protection
has been entirely neglected so far.
Most of the early empirical studies employ only flows of FDI as measure of economic globaliza-
tion and focus only on core labor standards set by the ILO (see footnote 2), but not on general
employment protection. Moreover, in this strand of the literature the research question is rather on
how costs of labor and social stability affect location decisions of investors, not on how globalization
affects the level of labor standards in a country (for an example, see Kucera (2002), and literature
cited therein).
3Theoretical arguments may well go into the opposite direction, predicting the impact of labor standards on trade
volume, see also Krueger (1996).
4Early empirical analyses on the effect of international trade on relative wages (skilled vs. unskilled) in the USA,
wage inequality worldwide, wage stability for production workers, trade and freedom-of-association-rights, trade and
rights to non-discrimination are described in Brown (2000).
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One of the first contributions to empirically relate trade openness, replacing FDI of the previous
analyses, with some specific core labor standards appear to be Shelburne (2001) and Cigno et al.
(2002): both papers find independently from each other that trade openness reduces the prevalence
of child labor – abolition of child exploitation is one of the core ILO labor conventions.
Busse (2004) uses this research as a starting point and extends it to incorporate also the re-
maining core labor standards covered by the ILO conventions. He finds in a fixed effects panel
analysis of 71 developing countries from 1970 to 2000 that more openness to trade appears to lead
to increased gender discrimination in the labor market, growing prevalence of child labor, and less
unions rights (freedom of association). Providing the rationale for the deterioration of certain labor
standards as national economies become more globalized, Busse and Spielmann (2006) show in a
panel fixed effects analysis of a world sample (1975-2000) that gender inequality in wages creates
a comparative advantage in the production of labor-intensive commodities. Already ten years ear-
lier, Rodrik (1996) identified long working hours and child labor (controlling for human capital) as
determinants of having a comparative advantage in the production of labor-intensive goods. While
the empirical analysis by Busse (2004) is an important contribution to the literature on the impact
of trade on core labor standards, it does not cover the effects on general employment protection.
In two recent studies, Walter (2010a,b) takes the analysis to the micro level and analyzes the
impact of globalization on voters’ demand for unemployment insurance as compensation for losses
from globalization, distinguishing between low-skilled and high skilled workers. She finds that
low-skilled workers perceive their risk of becoming unemployed due to globalization higher than
high-skilled workers, and, consequently, demand more generous unemployment insurance than high-
skilled workers.5 However, the author focuses on voters’ risk perceptions and resulting demands
rather than on policy outcomes, which is the focus of our paper.
Turning to the question of union rights which comes closest to measuring general ‘employment
protection’ of adult workers against e.g. mass dismissals and exploitative work contracts, Dreher
and Gaston (2005) find in a cross-section time-series of 17 OECD countries from 1980 to 1999 (with
country fixed effects) that globalization adversely affects density and attractiveness of unions – as
a consequence of, as they argue, their lower (relative) bargaining power. Testing several dimen-
sions of globalization, one of the few empirical contributions making such a distinction, they find
that this development is driven by the social dimension of globalization, which includes worldwide
communication, exchange of ideas, and convergence of local cultures. In contrast, the economic
and political dimensions do not appear to exert any impact. This is a noteworthy result given that
most arguments that link globalization with deunionization are rather economic or political (see e.g.
Wallerstein and Western, 2000). In this paper, we will equally distinguish between three dimensions
5Protte (2011) studies the source of these labor market risk perceptions, namely coverage in newspapers of different
political leaning and hence readers of different skill levels and types of jobs.
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of globalization, using an updated version of the index used in Dreher and Gaston (2005).
In contrast, contradictory findings to the analysis of Dreher and Gaston (2005) are reported
in the empirical study by Golden (2000): in a cross-section of 15 OECD countries for the 1980s
(1980-1990) her empirical model reveals a convergence of union strength towards a certain mean,
but a divergence in union density. In her study, this union development appears rather unaffected
by growing economic integration (measured by trade openness and the absence of restrictions of
capital mobility).
Contribution of this Paper
Our paper is the first to test a direct linkage between the phenomenon ‘globalization’ and the
economic outcome ‘employment protection’ through laws and administrative regulations: Instead,
preceding studies focus largely on aspects of union strength in place of employment protection –
with union strength assumingly approximating wage levels, wage inequality, and job security (e.g.
Blau and Kahn, 1996; Fortin and Lemieux, 1997) as labor market outcomes of globalization; in
other words, these studies merely assume a positive link between unionization and employment
protection, but fail to empirically show that this link actually exists. In addition, these studies also
do not account for the multifacetedness of globalization, focusing on either trade or FDI, ignoring
additional economic channels of globalization and their interplays. Indeed, globalization takes
place not only in the economic sphere, but also in the social and political spheres. Furthermore,
the literature either largely disregards worker heterogeneity or focuses only on differential effects, if
at all, on low-skilled and high-skilled workers, and ignore effects on different segments of the labor
market. Finally, from a methodological viewpoint, most of these studies neglect the problem of
potential endogeneity of international trade, as the study by e.g. Dewit et al. (2009) suggests.6
Taken altogether, an issue that has not yet been in the focus of economic analysis is the ques-
tion to what extent economic, social and political integration into the world impacts legislation
that aims at protecting average workers’ employment. To fill this gap, this paper is the first a)
to empirically test whether and how globalization affects workers’ employment protection and b)
to provide arguments for these possible linkages. While the violations of core labor standards em-
ployed in the previous literature (e.g. child labor) rather address differences between developed
and developing countries, we use a measure of employment protection that varies even across eco-
nomically and institutionally well advanced countries: employment protection of workers measures
e.g. the difficulty of (unfairly) dismissing them, their rights for compensation payments, and their
exploitation through ‘flexible contract’ arrangements. To take account of the economic phenomenon
of a growing importance of temporary work contracts in the European economies, we look at two
6Their empirical analysis for OECD countries with the same index of employment protection used in this study
suggests that relatively stricter protection of workers’ rights deters foreign direct investment, and keeps domestic
firms anchored in their home countries.
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distinct labor market sectors: that with regular (mostly permanent) work contracts, but equally
the sector of short-term contracts and temporary work agency employment.
By using the sub-indices of the KOF Index of Globalization7, we take account of the mul-
tifacetedness of economic integration that goes beyond simple trade openness and foreign direct
investment flows; in addition, using this index allows us to study whether the effects of globaliza-
tion differ across its various dimensions, namely its economic, social and political dimensions. A
battery of robustness tests completes the empirical analysis.
3. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Economic Globalization
As argued above, strict employment protection legislation comes at a cost to domestic firms,
possibly leading to their disadvantage in international competition. Hence, producers will demand
a reduction of employment protection the stronger, the more intense international economic inte-
gration and the resulting inflow of foreign products into the domestic market is (see Fischer, 2012).
In contrast, dependently employed workers, which form the majority of the workforce in developed
countries, can be assumed to have an interest in staying employed in the first place, whether they
hold regular or atypical contracts or not. Thus, all workers likewise expect to profit from a strict
employment protection, which they demand from politicians. Consequently, if workers’ jobs are put
under competitive pressure due to economic globalization, we suspect that workers favor policies
that increase the protection of their current jobs, at least in the short run. It is debatable whether
workers would be in favor of market deregulation policies that ensure the international competitive-
ness and the creation of new jobs in the long run, but might jeopardize their present employment.
Assuming bounded rationality and hyperbolic discounting, we rather expect workers to prefer pro-
tection of the present job over creation of new jobs in the far-away future. However, we cannot
completely reject the possibility that laborers with regular contracts may favor the lowering of their
job protection if this makes regular work contracts relatively more likely to be chosen by employers
than atypical, temporary work contracts. To satisfy the demand for making regular employment
more attractive than the atypical one, labor protection in the atypical sector should be increased
relative to protection in the regular sector.8 On the other hand, laborers may demand higher job
protection in exchange for their consent to politicians’ decision to increase their country’s openness.
In a public choice view where politicians respond to the aggregated preferences of the population,
with the electorate being diversely composed of workers with regular contracts, laborers with atypi-
cal contracts, and firm owners, the net effects of the combined demands by these population groups
7See Dreher (2006).
8The only group univocally being in favor of lowering employment protection in both segments would be the
unemployed worker, hoping for faster re-employment when labor market institutions are less rigid.
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for employment protection is ambiguous a priori and needs to be determined empirically.
The effects of globalization on the degree of employment protection in the labor market can be
more convincingly derived from political economy which assumes that it is the relative bargaining
or lobbying power of agents which determines policy outcomes. Given the stronger influence of
producers on politicians compared to workers (as there are fewer of them and thus more easily
coordinated, and as they have firm reallocation as credible exit option, while labor is immobile),
we predict that employment protection in the labor market will, in general, decline. However,
the political-economic theory of ‘linkage politics’, which constitutes some form of issue-bundling
resulting in log-rolling, predicts that economic globalization exerts a protectionist impact on one
labor market segment, but a deregulative one on the other. The phenomenon of ‘linkage politics’ was
first described in the literature on international negotiations between two countries with diverging
interests. Stein (1980) argues that consent to a specific reform that benefits one country can
be reached by linking the decision to reciprocal consent on a second reform that benefits the
other country. Mayer and Riezman (1987) take a more formal approach and find that such ‘policy
mixture’ (two interlinked reforms) constitutes an equilibrium outcome of a bargaining game between
two players, which makes both players better off compared to a situation without an agreement.
Application of the ‘linkage theory’ to the question of globalization effects for employment protection
rests on the general political economy assumption of conflicting interests between between two
groups: unions, which represent employed workers and prefer stricter employment regulation, and
producers, who prefer the opposite.9
In application of the theory of ‘linkage politics’ to our research question, we argue that domestic
employees and unions might trade off the detrimental effects of globalization in the regular contract
segment with stronger protection in the other, atypical contract segment. Given that the major
industrial branches are still in the traditional labor market segment with regular contracts, making
it economically more important than the segment with atypical work contracts, employers lobbying
for deregulation may be willing to trade more employment protection in the less important segment
for less protection in the atypical segment. The statistical facts show that in the EU-15 the share
of temporary employment in total dependent employment has risen from 4 percent in 1983 to
15 percent in 2007 (Franco and Winqvist, 2002), so that temporary employment segment is still
relatively dominated by the regular employment segment.10 Thus, it may well be that producer-
influenced politicians buy support of the worker- and union-dominated electorate for labor market
deregulation in the (traditional and economically more important) regular labor market segment by
9Again, the unemployed workers prefer less employment protection in either labor market segment. According to
common economic theory, unions are assumed to maximize the utility of their (employed) members only.
10Recent numbers for Germany (2008) indicate that the share of regularly employed (permanent contracts with
at least 20 working hours per weak) has declined since 1998 from 72.6 percent to 66 percent, while the share with
‘atypical’ contracts has increased from 16.2 per cent to 22.2 per cent. The same study reveals that the atypically
employed earns only about 2/3 of the wage of a regularly employed (see Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009).
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granting stronger employment protection in the less important temporary employment segment.11
Increasing labor protection in the atypical sector more relative to protection in the regular sector
is facilitated by the fact that regulation in the relatively new atypical employment sector is initially
quite low, i.e. politicians deliberately set incentives for employers that are overall welfare-improving:
politicians might relatively increase regulation in the temporary-contract sector with the intention
to make employers not substitute regular employment with short-term contract/TWA positions.
This argument rests on the stylized fact that, even though employment protection for the regularly
employed has declined over the last years, their job security still remains substantially higher than
that for those in ‘atypical’ employment. Given this latter sector’s minor economic importance, such
policy of relatively increasing employment protection in the atypical labor market segment while
contemporaneously decreasing overall employment protection still leads to an increase in overall
labor market flexibility. We have good reasons to assume that both producers’ and unionists’
lobbying pressure on politicians may be the stronger, the fiercer international competition and
economic globalization is.
Hence, according to the political economy theory of ‘linkage politics’ and relative lobbying
power, we expect economic globalization to decrease employment protection in both labor market
segments, also causing a relative increase in protection in the temporary contract labor market
segment compared to protection in the regular contract segment.12
Social Globalization
The lobbying pressure exerted by unions or workers might rise with exposure of a wider public
to the forces of globalization – reflected in the social dimension of globalization. People may mainly
experience or become aware of globalization by own cross-national travel and information exchange
through mass media and the internet; notably, without this international communication infras-
tructure, the existence and success of non-governmental organizations such as attac, Greenpeace
or Amnesty International would be unthinkable. Hence, social globalization might lay the grounds
for an international coordination of workers’ demands and a more forceful formulation, based on a
larger support, of their demands for an increase in labor protection. Analogously, producers’ lobby-
ing efforts may equally benefit from social globalization as it allows them to exchange information
worldwide on regulations and wages in competing countries. Social globalization also enhances the
dissemination of lobbying expertise and allows to build informal networks spanning across countries
that may be used to increase pressure on politicians to deregulate. Taken altogether, through the
11Similarly, we may argue that producer-influenced politicians buy support form the worker-dominated electorate
for further opening up of domestic markets by increasing employment protection in the economically less important
labor market segment.
12Note: this does not exclude a decrease in both sectors, if the decrease is larger in the regular sector than in the
atypical sector.
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international interconnectedness of agents and the resulting flow of information across countries,
social globalization may reinforce the demands and lobbying power of both workers and employ-
ers likewise. A priori, no prediction with respect to the overall impact of social globalization on
employment protection can be made.
Political Globalization
A similar argumentation applies to globalization in the political dimension through countries’
memberships in international and supranational organizations. Both unions’ and producers’ co-
ordination efforts are potentially supported by such memberships. From the unions’ perspective,
enhanced international policy coordination makes it easier to sustain stricter labor protection de-
spite growing international competition, as the cost of protection, if applied to all producers around
the world equally, does not bias their international competitiveness and, thus, does not affect their
relative profits. As in a prisoners’ dilemma game, regulation and enforcement through international
treaties aid sustain the cooperative equilibrium with strong employment protection, which is to the
benefit of the populations in the participating countries (Fischer, 2012; Petersen, 2009). Thus,
political globalization might even increase the protection of workers against dismissals and atypical
employment conditions, if countries with stricter regulations manage to impose an employment
protection policy on other countries by means of their memberships in international organizations,
which are a key aspect of political globalization. Examples for such efforts to internationally coor-
dinate on stricter labor market standards include agreements on core labor standards such as the
aforementioned ILO conventions and several EU standards concerning ethics in industrial produc-
tion.
On the other hand, producers, in search for new markets, may internationally coordinate on
promoting international trade and tearing down legal and technical obstacles to exporting and
importing goods and services. Again, in a prisoners’ dilemma game mutually granting access to
each other’s domestic market represents the cooperative equilibrium, with both players (countries)
profiting, while a unilateral (bilateral) imposition of trade-preventing tariffs would leave the other
(both) player(s) with a substantial welfare loss (Sinn, 2001). Thus, political globalization may be
instrumentalized by producers to increase openness and to access new markets, thus raising inter-
national competition and the competitive pressure exerted on domestic labor markets. Examples
for such efforts to coordinate on liberalization in international trade include the signing of treaties
that established the European Economic Area and the WTO.13
Taken altogether, on the one hand, membership in international organizations may well prevent
a race of labor standards to the bottom, but, on the other, may also increase the pressure of
13The notion ‘international trade’ in this paragraph also captures international capital flows to which very similar
arguments can be applied. In such case, stricter employment protection would decrease the return on investment,
making investment objects less attractive for foreign and domestic investors.
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international competition to deregulate domestic labor markets. Overall, the predicted effects of
political globalization on employment protection remain ambiguous.
Overall Globalization
In addition to the sub-indices for economic, political and social globalization, we also employ a
compound measure of globalization combining these three sub-indices. Given the a priori indeter-
minate effects of social and political globalization on employment protection, we suspect that the
direction of the impact of overall globalization is driven by economic globalization, increasing the
probability that we will find overall globalization to decrease employment protection.
In a second step of our analysis, we investigate whether the forces of globalization interact with
the political condition of a country. In particular, we test whether the influence of a country’s
degree of international integration varies depending on the political leaning of the governing party.
4. Data and Empirical Strategy
4.1. Employment Protection Legislation
For our analysis, we use the index of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), Version 1,
provided by OECD (2004) for 28 OECD countries, from 1985 to 2003.14 The EPL is based on
government information and measures, in general, the protection of workers against specific forms
of economic and financial exploitation through their employers.15
For regularly employed workers, the relevant EPL index (‘EPLreg’) measures the overall strict-
ness of protection with respect to four areas: The difficulty of individual dismissals, notice and
severance pay for no-fault individual dismissals, the overall strictness of protection against dis-
missals, and regular procedural inconveniences. Thus, this measure takes into account the possible
reasons for an individual lay-off, the regulation of advance notice and severance pay, trial peri-
ods, conditions under which lay-offs are unjustified, and compensation payment in case of such
unjustified dismissals.
In contrast, for workers holding fixed-term work contracts or workers who are employed by
temporary work agencies (so-called atypical work contracts), EPL (‘EPLtemp’) captures the overall
strength of restrictions on establishing and maintaining such temporary employment. OECD names
14The excluded countries are Iceland and Luxembourg with no observations of EPL. The included countries are:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
15This index excludes aspects of mass dismissals that are taken into account in a more recent version of the EPL
index (“Version 2”), which, however, covers a much smaller time span. The first time point of measurement of EPL
version 2 is 1998, that of version 1 the year 1985. Notably, as stated in OECD (2004) p.102, the regulation of mass
dismissals forms only an additional protection against a rather rare form of lay-off, and in many countries regulations
of individual and mass dismissals are fairly identical.
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the three areas covered by this EPL index ‘fixed-term contracts’, ‘overall strictness of regulation’,
and ‘temporary work agencies’. These areas include the regulation of the number of possible re-
newals of fixed-term contracts, the maximum accumulated contract duration (in months), whether
fixed-term contracts are generally permitted or restricted to certain industry sectors only, or re-
stricted to certain types of work (e.g. to temporarily replacing a long-term sick worker or a worker
on parental leave).
Each EPL index (EPLreg, EPLtemp) ranges from 0 to 6 with continuous intervals, and higher
values indicate a stronger employment protection of workers. In general, each EPL index is cal-
culated as an average of points awarded to its specific sub-dimensions in a four-step aggregation
procedure (see OECD, 2004, chapter 2). Due to the four-step construction procedure of the index,
small changes in the overall index may reflect considerable institutional changes: For example, a
change from the oral notification of dismissal to a procedure where a written statement giving
reasons must be provided and a work council must be notified increases the EPL index of regular
employment by just 0.33 points (see also OECD, 2004, p. 103 and p. 106). Similarly, a move from
restricting the number of (consecutive) short-term contracts renewals to having no restrictions de-
creases the EPL for temporary employment by only 0.125 points. Table 8 of Section 8 provides
descriptive statistics of the indices of employment protection in OECD countries.
An overview of the legal and institutional changes in OECD countries with respect to employ-
ment protection from 1985 on is reported in Table 7 in section 8. Table 7 also illustrates in what
directions these institutional changes influenced the two EPL indices of regular and temporary em-
ployment. The general impression is that, on average, since 1985 the EPL index has been falling, for
either type of employment. However, in some countries specific labor market reforms had a neutral
effect on the index (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Sweden), while, contrary to
the general impression, a few reforms even improved on workers’ employment protection (Australia,
France, Great Britain, New Zealand). Notably, the effects of these labor market reforms are not
even heterogeneous across countries or time, but also within a country across types of employment.
For example, Finland and Portugal appear to have liberalized the regular employment sector, while
the employment protection index for temporary employment remained unaffected. Similarly, in
Korea the reduction in protection in the regular sector was significantly larger than in the tempo-
rary sector. The exact opposite observation is made for Germany, Italy and Japan, in which only
the protection of the temporarily employed was lowered. Figures 1 and 2 show the development
of employment protection in both sectors for a selection of countries. Figure 1 displays the de-
velopment of employment protection in the regular sector during the time span studied. There is
substantial variation between the countries. Within the time series, we see that employment pro-
tection has stayed constant over time in some countries (Japan, USA), regardless of the initial level
of regulation in these countries, while others have seen substantial decreases in protection (Finland,
Korea, Spain), and a few countries have even experienced small increases in employment protection
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(Australia, Germany, France). Furthermore, there seems to be a convergence to a common level of
labor protection for the European and Asian countries, decreasing average employment protection
in the regular sector.
Figure 1: Employment protection, regular employment, selected countries, 1985-2003
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Source: OECD (2004), own calculations.
Figure 2 shows the development of regulation in the atypical employment sector between 1985
and 2003. There is substantial variation between the countries, even larger than in the regular
employment sector. We also see substantial deregulation in some countries (Germany, Japan and
to some extent Korea), while there has been no change in countries that already had a low level of
regulation at the beginning of the time span of the sample (Australia, Finland, USA). In France,
regulation has increased, while in Spain, an increase followed a decrease in regulation. Hence, there
seems to be no clear trend in the development of regulation in this sector.
4.2. Globalization: Economic, Political and Social Dimensions
Globalization is measured by the annual KOF Index of Globalization developed by Dreher
(2006), which measures the degree of globalization from 1970 onwards, on a 0 to 100 scale. Its three
sub-indices cover a country’s economic, political, and social dimensions of globalization. All three
dimensions contribute with equal weights to the overall index of globalization.16
16The index is now widely used, e.g. by Gemmell et al. (2008), Lamo et al. (2008) and Aidt and Gassebner (2010).
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Figure 2: Employment protection, atypical employment, selected countries, 1985-2003
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Source: OECD (2004), own calculations.
Economic globalization includes not only the traditional aspects of cross-national flows of goods
and services, but also measures of foreign investment (direct, portfolio), the absence of traditional
barriers to trade and capital flows, as well as indicators of internationalization of a country’s labor
force. The political dimension of globalization is captured mainly by a country’s number of mem-
berships in international organizations, foreign embassies, and participations in UN peace missions.
Finally, social globalization aims at measuring the spread and exchange of ideas, values, images and
people. This aspect is captured by, for example, fast food chain prevalence (as indicator of U.S.
culture influence), cross-national trade in books and newspapers, but also international tourism
and number of internet users. Overall, aspects of social globalization can be grouped into ‘personal
contacts’, ‘information flow’ and ‘cultural proximity’ (see also Dreher and Gaston, 2005).
Table 8 of Section 8 at the end of this paper provides descriptive statistics of the globalization
measures in our sample of OECD countries, which all endorse the principles of free trade. The index
of economic globalization has a considerably large mean of 73.5 points, but ranges still from 37.8
to 96.0, resulting in a standard deviation of 12.5. The development of globalization is not uniform
in our sample: the speed by which a nation opened itself economically (as well as politically and
socially) varies by country and world region, even among OECD member states which share, by
definition of their membership, similar economic and political institutions.
Figure 3 shows the development of overall globalization and its three sub-categories for the
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same selection of countries as in Figures 1 and 2 from 1970 to 2003. Generally, we see substantial
variation both between countries and within the time series, and a trend towards a higher level
of globalization in all four panels. Except for social globalization, Japan seems to be far less
internationally integrated than the rest of the countries. The US, starting with a relatively high
level of globalization in all fields, is overtaken by all countries except for Japan in overall, economic,
and political globalization over time. At the end of the period studied, even the former communist-
block Czech Republic is more globalized in these fields, after a rapid catch-up during the nineties,
than the US. Also Spain has experienced a substantial increase in international integration, both in
absolute terms and relative to other countries. The Scandinavian countries show the highest level
of overall, economic, and political globalization. Somewhat different from the other three panels is
the graph for political globalization. Here, there is no time trend, and large variation in the time
series for some of the countries. Here, however, the US is in the top position both at the beginning
and at the end of the time series, while the Scandinavian countries are only in the midfield. The
pattern for Spain and the Czech Republic is the same as in the other fields of globalization: A large
absolute and relative increase in social globalization. Hence, there is not only substantial variation
within the time series and across countries, there is also variation over time in the relative levels
of globalization between the single countries, i.e. variation in the data is not only cross-sectional
(constant distance between lines), but also across time (local differences in steepness), even when
the model includes time fixed effects that take out the common development pattern.
4.3. Controlling Variables
In this analysis, as controlling variables we also employ data on unemployment rate, unemploy-
ment benefit spending (as share of gross domestic product (GDP)), population size, and national
income (GDP), its 5-year growth rate, all obtained from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicator (WDI) database (World Bank, 2009). Furthermore, we measure the political leaning of
the government in two different ways. First, we use a dummy indicating a left-wing government,
which has been constructed from data available in the updated version (2005) of Beck et al. (2001).
Second, we use the index developed in Bjørnskov (2008), which is based on the number of seats
held by the parties in government and, thus, continuous. This index of government ideology ranges
between the values -1 and 1, where -1 indicates a fully left-wing government and 1 a right-wing
government. Although the maximum number of observations is 486 country-years, due to some
missing values in the remaining explanatory variables, we obtain an unbalanced panel with a max-
imum of 480 observations. The unemployment rate and unemployment spending (in log) are used
to proxy pressure to loosen employment protection emerging from the situation in the domestic
labor market. We furthermore control for the five year GDP growth rate and national income,
as faster growing and richer countries are more likely to have strong unions, possibly leading to
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Figure 3: Globalization and its sub-components, 1970-2003
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Source: KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006), own calculations.
stricter employment protection (see Dreher and Gaston, 2005; Wallerstein and Western, 2000).17
We use the five year growth rate as we want to control for structural aspects of the economy. The
business cycle is controlled for by the unemployment rate and year fixed effects. We also include
the logarithm of the population size that accounts for the size of the domestic market, with a larger
domestic demand possibly implying less ‘need’ for domestic firms to expand internationally, lower-
ing competitive pressure by foreign competitors on domestic labor standards. The exact definitions
of the variables in the empirical model and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 8.
17The direct inclusion of unionization as a controlling variable would reduce the sample size from 26 to 20 countries.
We introduce unionization in a separate regression as a robustness check later. The main results remain the same.
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4.4. Model
In our model we view employment protection legislation in country i at time t (EPLit) as a
function of globalization in the same country (GLOBit), and a set of country-specific controlling
factors (Xit) that might be correlated with both the focal variable and the dependent variable.
Country (FEi) and year (Tt) fixed effects account for unobserved country heterogeneity due to
time-invariant national characteristics (such as certain labor market regulations and features of the
insurance system) and year-specific (but country-unspecific) factors (such as world-wide economic
shocks). A preliminary Hausman test rejected the random effects specification in favor of the fixed
effects model, which we employ. An F-test of joint significance indicates that the year effects should
not be omitted from the equation.18 An error term (ǫit) completes the model.
Potential simultaneity might bias the estimated coefficient vector. We address this issue by
employing country fixed effects and lagging the explanatory variables by two periods.19 This specific
lag structure is chosen on theoretical grounds, particularly because in most OECD countries the
legislature period is four years, so that a 2-year lag might account for the duration of the legislating
process and politicians’ response time to changes in their party majorities triggered by new economic
developments, particularly changes in the degree of globalization. Furthermore, as robustness test
for the effects of globalization we estimate a more parsimonious model that excludes some of the
potentially endogenous determinants. The complete model looks as follows:
EPLit = α+ βGLOBit−2 + γXit−2 + FEi + Tt + ǫit, (1)
where EPLit denotes the different indices of employment protection, and GLOBit−2 is the
respective (sub-)index of globalization. The vector Xit−2 contains the controlling variables, FEi
and Tt represent country and time fixed effects, ǫit is the error term, α is a constant, and β and γ
are parameters.
5. Results
5.1. Results
In general, we find that globalization exerts a significant effect on employment protection. In
line with our reasoning, we find these effects to differ in magnitude and significance between the
different dimensions of globalization as well as between the different segments of the labor market.
According to Table 1, column 1, the protection of regular employment appears lowered by
overall globalization, while column 1 of Table 2 reveals that the net effect of overall globalization on
protection of the temporarily employed is actually positive. Given the relatively small size of the
18A Tobit model would yield inconsistent estimates due to the inclusion of fixed-effects.
19Lack of suitable instruments does not allow for testing the exogeneity assumption.
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Table 1: Globalization and protection of regularly employed, 1985-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) -0.296 -0.146 -0.476* -0.534** -0.731***
[1.09] [0.54] [1.82] [2.02] [2.76]
Log Population (-2) 2.268*** 2.423*** 2.399*** 2.652*** 2.489***
[5.98] [6.42] [6.34] [6.98] [6.31]
Unemployment rate (-2) 0.007 0.010* 0.011* 0.003 0.004
[1.27] [1.82] [1.93] [0.59] [0.78]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.077** -0.086*** -0.113*** -0.069** -0.090***
[2.56] [2.81] [3.73] [2.22] [2.89]
GDP growth (-2) 0.012 0.008 0.022 0.025* 0.032**
[0.82] [0.53] [1.50] [1.73] [2.18]
Left-wing govt. (-2) 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.049*** 0.062*** 0.049**
[2.99] [3.36] [2.60] [3.24] [2.55]
Globalization, overall (-2) -0.018***
[4.95]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.012*** -0.011***
[4.97] [4.51]
Political glob. (-2) -0.008*** -0.007***
[4.30] [3.80]
Social glob. (-2) -0.001 -0.002
[0.61] [1.09]
Constant -21.430*** -24.366*** -21.802*** -24.507*** -21.486***
[4.05] [4.58] [4.10] [4.54] [3.87]
Observations 401 401 401 401 401
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26
R-squared (within) 0.31 0.34 0.30 0.29 0.27
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and
year fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
atypical employment sector, overall globalization seems to lead to a general decrease of employment
protection in the economy, but also to an increase of protection in the atypical sector compared to
the regular sector.
For the regularly employed, we find the protection-lowering effect of overall globalization (Table
1, column 1) to be driven by its economic and political dimensions. Both exert a significant negative
impact on employment protection – independently as well as when simultaneously included in the
regressions (Table 1, columns 2 to 5). Simultaneous inclusion lets us rule out the possibility that
one dimension simply proxies the other in the single dimension regressions (Table 1, column 2).
Social globalization is found to exert no statistically significant effect. For the regular employment
sector, a simple comparison of the estimated coefficients indicates that economic globalization
has quantitatively the largest effect on employment protection. The size of the effect is quite
considerable: An increase in economic globalization (running from 0 to 100) by 10 score points
lowers employment protection by roughly 0.12 points, a change in EPL that could be triggered by
e.g. liberalizing the dismissal procedure from one in which a third party approval is required to a
regulation according to which only a simple notification of a work council is needed (decreases EPL
by 0.15 points).
Taking the results of Table 1 together, mainly economic, but also political globalization ap-
pear to weaken the laws protecting regular employment. This finding is in support of traditional
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Table 2: Globalization and protection of atypically employed, 1985-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) 2.891*** 3.194*** 3.994*** 3.234*** 3.136***
[3.88] [4.32] [5.53] [4.50] [4.49]
Log Population (-2) 8.849*** 8.868*** 8.175*** 8.262*** 9.184***
[8.47] [8.53] [7.84] [7.97] [8.82]
Unemployment rate (-2) 0.000 0.014 0.011 0.006 0.005
[0.03] [0.93] [0.76] [0.41] [0.35]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.124 -0.188** -0.123 -0.139 -0.135
[1.50] [2.24] [1.47] [1.64] [1.64]
GDP growth (-2) -0.076* -0.086** -0.127*** -0.094** -0.082**
[1.86] [2.14] [3.19] [2.39] [2.11]
Left-wing govt. (-2) 0.081 0.078 0.089* 0.070 0.094*
[1.57] [1.52] [1.73] [1.34] [1.86]
Globalization, overall (-2) 0.027***
[2.72]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.013* -0.014*
[1.94] [1.93]
Political glob. (-2) 0.009* 0.011**
[1.75] [2.20]
Social glob. (-2) 0.020*** 0.021***
[3.78] [3.85]
Constant -132.640*** -137.581*** -131.973*** -127.800*** -141.235***
[9.11] [9.38] [9.02] [8.68] [9.64]
Observations 401 401 401 401 401
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 26
R-squared (within) 0.43 0.45 0.42 0.42 0.44
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for atypically employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and
year fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
and political economy models of international trade suggesting that fiercer international market
competition makes domestic firms lobby for more domestic labor market flexibility.
In contrast, Table 2 shows that protection of fixed-term and temporary-work-agency employed
workers (‘atypical contracts’) is actually increased by globalization, measured by its general index
(column 1). However, this time it is not the economic dimension of globalization that gives rise to
this finding, which again exerts a negative effect (Table 2, column 3). Instead, it is the social and
political dimensions of globalization that strengthen employment protection (Table 2, columns 4 and
5), outweighing the labor standards lowering effect of economic globalization. Again, an increase in
political globalization of 10 points would result in an substantial increase in EPL for ‘atypical’ forms
of employments that equaled, for example, restricting the number of contract renewals, or changing
the maximum of cumulated contract duration from ‘no limitation’ to ‘24 months’ (= + 0.125 points).
Column 2 includes all three dimensions of globalization. It confirms the preceding single-dimension
analyses, i.e. the positive net effect of overall globalization on protection of temporary employment,
being driven entirely by its non-economic dimensions (social and political).
Turning to the effects of our controlling variables, we observe some similarities and some dissim-
ilarities across the two different labor market segments. For both segments, Tables 1 and 2 show
that populous countries tend to protect their workers better, while the unemployment rate seems
to exert no effect. A larger burden of unemployment spending in the economy exerts a pressure to
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deregulate the labor market – particularly for the regularly employed.20 Furthermore, as countries
grow richer, protection of temporarily employed workers increases, as predicted, while the protec-
tion of regularly employed is decreased. Economic performance in the past five years, as measured
by the five year growth rate of GDP, seems to have no large influence on protection in the regular
sector, while lo-wering protection in the atypical sector. For regular employment, supporting our
reasoning above, we also find that left-wing governments tend to support a higher level of em-
ployment protection. In tendency, this effect is also observable for temporary employment, albeit
statistically weaker. The findings are similar when we employ a continuous variable as alternative
measure of government ideology instead of the dummy variable (Tables 3 and 4).
Taking the results of Table 2 altogether, we find that globalization in its social and political
dimensions put an upward pressure on protection of workers with ‘atypical’ contracts. In con-
trast, the economic dimension appears to decrease labor standards, yielding a positive net effect of
globalization on labor protection in this sector.
Combining the results of Tables 1 and 2, we find that economic globalization decreases labor
protection. In contrast, political (and social) globalization influence protection negatively in the
regular sector, but positively in the atypical sector, in sum leading to a relative increase of protection
in the latter sector compared to protection in the first.
5.2. Robustness
Our main results are robust to several changes in the specification of the regression and in the
sample. The Tables presenting the results of the robustness check can be found in Section 8 at
the end of this paper. We obtain results that are qualitatively similar (in terms of coefficient sizes
and direction of influence of globalization measures) if a more parsimonious model is estimated
that omits those variables that are potentially endogenous to employment protection, such as the
unemployment rate, GDP growth, and left-wing ideology of the government (see Tables 9 and 10).
Moreover, the findings are robust to estimating our models with a reduced sample that excludes
the former communist countries Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovak Republic (see Tables
11 and 12); this test rejects the claim that our findings were driven by transition countries that,
from 1991 on, underwent extreme changes in their international economic integration, as discussed
in Section 4. The results are also qualitatively unaltered when we take autocorrelation of the
residuals into account or when we replace the dichotomous indicator of government ideology with
a continuous measure (see Tables 3 and 4).
Our results remain also unaltered when we include union density as an additional control vari-
able (see Tables 13 and 14). Again, we find a negative effect of the overall index of globalization on
20The negative correlation between the generosity of unemployment benefits and employment protection was
already reported in OECD (2004, p. 92).
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Table 3: Globalization and protection of regularly employed, 1985-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) 0.024 0.174 -0.216 -0.235 -0.449
[0.08] [0.60] [0.77] [0.82] [1.57]
Log Population (-2) 2.586*** 2.691*** 2.658*** 3.110*** 2.879***
[6.15] [6.41] [6.29] [7.38] [6.60]
Unemployment rate (-2) 0.005 0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.001
[0.88] [1.44] [1.64] [0.17] [0.22]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.061** -0.068** -0.102*** -0.048 -0.074**
[2.06] [2.24] [3.37] [1.55] [2.42]
GDP growth (-2) -0.004 -0.009 0.008 0.006 0.015
[0.28] [0.59] [0.52] [0.37] [0.96]
Right-wing govt., continuous (-2) -0.102*** -0.111*** -0.088*** -0.091*** -0.077**
[3.38] [3.75] [2.94] [3.01] [2.51]
Globalization, overall (-2) -0.019***
[5.16]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.013*** -0.012***
[5.16] [4.63]
Political glob. (-2) -0.008*** -0.007***
[4.43] [3.86]
Social glob. (-2) -0.002 -0.002
[0.96] [1.23]
Constant -27.775*** -30.053*** -26.953*** -32.305*** -28.043***
[4.61] [5.00] [4.43] [5.22] [4.47]
Observations 396 396 396 396 396
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared (within) 0.32 0.35 0.31 0.30 0.27
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and
year fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Political orientation of the government is measured by the
continuous ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
levels respectively.
20
Table 4: Globalization and protection of atypically employed, 1985-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) 2.820*** 2.990*** 4.006*** 3.181*** 3.217***
[3.50] [3.73] [5.12] [4.08] [4.21]
Log Population (-2) 9.995*** 9.624*** 9.024*** 9.075*** 10.130***
[8.59] [8.24] [7.70] [7.89] [8.72]
Unemployment rate (-2) -0.017 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.012
[1.18] [0.17] [0.24] [0.50] [0.86]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.101 -0.169** -0.094 -0.131 -0.100
[1.22] [2.01] [1.13] [1.55] [1.22]
GDP growth (-2) -0.110** -0.112** -0.158*** -0.124*** -0.124***
[2.51] [2.58] [3.67] [2.87] [2.93]
Right-wing govt., continuous (-2) 0.120 0.114 0.061 0.108 0.096
[1.44] [1.39] [0.73] [1.30] [1.18]
Globalization, overall (-2) 0.032***
[3.15]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.010 -0.011
[1.36] [1.52]
Political glob. (-2) 0.013** 0.015***
[2.47] [2.78]
Social glob. (-2) 0.019*** 0.019***
[3.47] [3.57]
Constant -144.884*** -141.520*** -141.360*** -136.282*** -149.233***
[8.69] [8.45] [8.37] [8.06] [8.94]
Observations 396 396 396 396 396
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared (within) 0.43 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.43
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for atypically employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and
year fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Political orientation of the government is measured by the
continuous ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
levels respectively.
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protection of regularly employed workers and a zero net effect for the temporary-contract sector.
Turning to the sub-indices of globalization, in line with our previous findings, the coefficients of
economic, political, and social globalization turn out negative and significant for the regular em-
ployment sector. For the atypical-contract sector, we find again that the negative effect of economic
globalization is compensated by a positive effect of political globalization.
6. The Role of Government Ideology
The impact exerted by globalization might not only be direct, but also indirect. More specifically,
the effects of globalization that weaken employment protection might be amplified through the
ideology of the incumbent government. Put differently, we can expect interplays between the three
dimensions of globalization and government ideology. In the following we test this conjecture for a
right-wing ideology of the government, which was previously found to lower employment protection,
at least for the regularly employed.
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of this exercise. We employ the continuous measure of right-
wing government ideology by Bjørnskov (2008) in place of the previously employed dichotomous
indicator for left-wing governments. The models with the odd numbers (1, 3, and 5) report the
findings for the baseline specifications of Tables 3 and 4, while the models with the even numbers
(2, 4, and 6) add interaction terms to the empirical model.
For the regularly employed (Table 5), only the interaction for economic globalization is signif-
icant; the negative sign indicates that right-wing government ideology aggravates the protection-
lowering impact of economic globalization: the government responds the stronger to the forces of
economic globalization, the more right-wing it is (column 4). Such interactions with government
ideology are not observable for the political and social dimensions of globalization (columns 6 and
8).
For the temporarily employed (Table 6), we observe a positive and significant interaction be-
tween political globalization and right-wing ideology (column 6), while the remaining interaction
terms are insignificant. Obviously, right-wing government ideology aggravates the protection-
enhancing effect of political globalization: conservative governments are more likely to seek in-
ternational co-operative solutions to protect the atypically employed, possibly to avoid a reduction
in relative competitiveness by ensuring internationally harmonized labor standards.
In sum, for the regularly employed, a right-wing government is more likely to give in to the
pressure to deregulate exerted by economic globalization than a leftist one, while they make better
use of political globalization to protect workers with atypical contracts. These results suggest that
the ‘policy mixture’ strategy (see Section 3) – appeasing the workforce and unions by stronger
protecting the economically far less important atypical contract employees, while reducing the
employment protection of the regularly employed – is a policy particularly pursued by right-wing
governments.
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Table 5: Interaction between globalization and government ideology for regular employment, 1985-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log GDP (-2) 0.024 0.024 -0.216 -0.259 -0.235 -0.221 -0.449 -0.440
[0.08] [0.08] [0.77] [0.92] [0.82] [0.77] [1.57] [1.53]
Log Population (-2) 2.586*** 2.585*** 2.658*** 2.842*** 3.110*** 3.102*** 2.879*** 2.842***
[6.15] [6.07] [6.29] [6.56] [7.38] [7.35] [6.60] [6.47]
Unemployment rate (-2) 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.88] [0.88] [1.64] [1.61] [0.17] [0.15] [0.22] [0.23]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.061** -0.061** -0.102*** -0.100*** -0.048 -0.051 -0.074** -0.075**
[2.06] [2.05] [3.37] [3.31] [1.55] [1.62] [2.42] [2.44]
GDP growth (-2) -0.004 -0.004 0.008 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.015 0.014
[0.28] [0.28] [0.52] [0.72] [0.37] [0.30] [0.96] [0.89]
Right-wing govt., continuous (-2) -0.102*** -0.102 -0.088*** 0.331 -0.091*** -0.177 -0.077** -0.179
[3.38] [0.50] [2.94] [1.41] [3.01] [1.13] [2.51] [1.26]
Globalization, overall (-2) -0.019*** -0.019***
[5.16] [5.05]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.012*** -0.011***
[4.63] [4.00]
Political glob. (-2) -0.007*** -0.008***
[3.86] [3.85]
Social glob. (-2) -0.002 -0.003
[1.23] [1.40]
Globalization (-2) * right-wing govt. (-2) 0.000 -0.006* 0.001 0.001
[0.00] [1.79] [0.55] [0.74]
Constant -27.775*** -27.773*** -26.953*** -28.896*** -32.305*** -32.315*** -28.043*** -27.642***
[4.61] [4.58] [4.43] [4.69] [5.22] [5.22] [4.47] [4.39]
Observations 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared (within) 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.27
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). Globalization
is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Political orientation of the government is measured by the continuous ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value of t-statistics in
brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 6: Interaction between globalization and government ideology for atypical employment, 1985-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log GDP (-2) 2.820*** 2.875*** 4.006*** 3.987*** 3.181*** 3.341*** 3.217*** 3.216***
[3.50] [3.56] [5.12] [5.07] [4.08] [4.29] [4.21] [4.20]
Log Population (-2) 9.995*** 9.835*** 9.024*** 9.106*** 9.075*** 8.992*** 10.130*** 10.136***
[8.59] [8.36] [7.70] [7.53] [7.89] [7.85] [8.72] [8.66]
Unemployment rate (-2) -0.017 -0.017 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 -0.012 -0.012
[1.18] [1.15] [0.24] [0.25] [0.50] [0.44] [0.86] [0.86]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.101 -0.109 -0.094 -0.093 -0.131 -0.164* -0.100 -0.100
[1.22] [1.32] [1.13] [1.11] [1.55] [1.92] [1.22] [1.22]
GDP growth (-2) -0.110** -0.114*** -0.158*** -0.156*** -0.124*** -0.134*** -0.124*** -0.124***
[2.51] [2.60] [3.67] [3.61] [2.87] [3.12] [2.93] [2.92]
Right-wing govt., continuous (-2) 0.120 -0.402 0.061 0.246 0.108 -0.806* 0.096 0.112
[1.44] [0.70] [0.73] [0.37] [1.30] [1.90] [1.18] [0.30]
Globalization, overall (-2) 0.032*** 0.030***
[3.15] [2.90]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.011 -0.011
[1.52] [1.39]
Political glob. (-2) 0.015*** 0.011**
[2.78] [2.01]
Social glob. (-2) 0.019*** 0.019***
[3.57] [3.39]
Globalization (-2) * right-wing govt. (-2) 0.007 -0.002 0.011** -0.000
[0.92] [0.28] [2.19] [0.04]
Constant -144.884*** -143.301*** -141.360*** -142.221*** -136.282*** -136.389*** -149.233*** -149.294***
[8.69] [8.54] [8.37] [8.28] [8.06] [8.11] [8.94] [8.90]
Observations 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared (within) 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for atypically employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and year fixed effects (not reported). Globalization
is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Political orientation of the government is measured by the continuous ideology index developed by Bjørnskov (2008). Absolute value of t-statistics in
brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper we have empirically investigated whether globalization exerts a downward pressure
on the protection of workers’ employment conditions. It is the first contribution to account for the
various dimensions of globalization, the economic, the political, and the social one. It is also the
first analysis to differentiate between regular and atypical employment.
Using a panel of 28 OECD countries from 1985 to 2003, we test for the impact of globalization in
its economic, political, and social dimensions on the strictness of employment protection legislation.
We reveal that overall globalization lowers employment protection of the regularly employed, but
increases that of workers in ‘atypical’ employment relations. We argue that relatively improving the
protection of the economically less important group of short-term workers may serve as symbolic
political act by vote-maximizing politicians intending to ‘buy’ workers’ acceptance of labor market
liberalization for the regularly employed.
The analysis for the single dimensions of globalization is supportive of this political economy
interpretation: We find that it is the economic dimension of globalization, possibly triggering
producers’ lobbying activities, which lowers employment protection for regularly employed workers,
as predicted by international trade models. We also find that political globalization, possibly one
of the transmission channels of producer preferences, adds to this downward pressure. However,
for workers in atypical employment, the negative effect of economic globalization is more than
outweighed by the effects of international political and social integration, where the latter possibly
makes the common workers aware of the phenomenon of globalization through international travel
and worldwide communication, while political globalization acts as a means of international policy
coordination for the harmonization of labor standards.
Furthermore, we find that the effects of globalization are aggravated by domestic political deter-
minants of labor protection: The deregulative influence of economic globalization on the regularly
employed is the larger, the more conservative a government is. At the same time, right-wing gov-
ernments make regulation of the temporary employment sector the stricter, the more the country
is globalized in the political dimension. We view the relevance of globalization in its interplay with
political leaning for employment protection as support for the political economy interpretation of
‘linkage politics’, suggesting that particularly right-wing politicians trade off deregulation of one
labor market sector against a stronger regulation of the other.
Overall, this analysis suggests that the economic and societal effects of globalization are not as
clear-cut as some public discussions may suggest. The common intuition that globalization is detri-
mental to the well-being of the dependently employed can only be partly supported. It appears that
workers in atypical employment contracts, commonly viewed as more vulnerable as compared to
the regularly employed, are not negatively affected by the forces exerted by globalization. Further-
more, our interplay analysis also suggests that the process of globalization is used as an argument
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in the political debate, so that, depending on government ideology, government response either ag-
gravates or counteracts the effects of globalization. Our analysis also reveals that this government
response does not necessarily follow traditional ideological lines, contradicting common views and
simple truths. However, to identify the exact mechanism behind this development in greater detail,
further research is needed.
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8. Tables
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Table 7: Break points of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indices
Reform description EPL overall EPL regular contracts EPL temp. contracts
Australia 1996 Workplace Relations Act 1996 set out factors that Aus-
tralian Industrial Relations Commission must have regard
to when determining whether a termination is unfair
+ + =
2004 The scale for employers with 15 or more employees has
also increased in March 2004 (the small business exemp-
tion to severance pay has been removed, now requiring
employers with less than 15 employees to pay).
+ + =
Austria 2003 Employees Income Provision Act eliminated severance
paid and integrated into individual saving accounts ac-
cessible during unemployment spells
- - =
Belgium 1997 Restriction on TWA were reduced and FTC were made
renewable
- = -
2000 Tightening of rule concerning notice period and compen-
sation in case of unjustified dismissal for blue collar work-
ers
= = =
2002 The maximum total duration of TWA was lengthened for
contracts justified by temporary increase in work-load
(Dec. 2001)
= = =
Canada No changes
Czech Republic No changes
Denmark 1995 Since the mid-1990s the role of TWA has been recognized
by social partners and their scope increased
- = -
Finland 1991 The delay before notice can start was shortened from 2
months (as set in the Act on the Dismissal Procedure) to
1-2 weeks (as set in the Act of Employment Contracts)
- - =
1996 Notice period was halved for workers with tenure less than
1 year
- - =
2001 The new employment contract act came into force reduc-
ing notice periods further
- - =
France 1986 Prior administrative authorization for dismissals for eco-
nomic reasons was abolished
- - =
1990 The list limiting the circumstances in which the use of
FTC and TWA is permissible is restored and the maxi-
mum total duration of FTC and TWA was reduced
+ = +
2001 Severance pay entitlements were increased = + =
Germany 1985 FTC were allowed without specifying an objective reason
1993 Notice period for blue collar workers was extended and
aligned with that of white collar workers
= + =
1994 TWA legislation was loosened - = -
1996 The renewal period for FTC and TWA and admissible
frequency of renewals were increased
- = -
2002 Maximum total duration of TWA was brought to 24
months
- = -
2004 The limit on the maximum total duration of TWA was
lifted. (from 1. Jan 2004)
- = -
Greece 1990 Notice period or severance pay entitlements were reduced
(law 1989) amending law 3198/55 of 1955)
- - =
2003 National General Collective Labour Agreement (2002-
2003) changes dismissal rules and raises slightly entitle-
ments to severance pay
- - =
2003 PD 81/2003 changes FTC and TWA - = -
Hungary 2003 The amended labour code introduced stricter regulations
on renewal of fixed term contracts
+ = +
Ireland 2003 The Protection of Employees act tightened regulation on
valid cases for FTC and limited their maximum overall
duration to 4 years
+ = +
2003 The Redundancy Payments Bill (dismissal laws) raised
severance pay entitlements
= = =
Italy 1987 Fixed term contracts use was widened through collec-
tive agreements specifying target groups and employment
shares
= = =
1997 Treu package on FTC widened the number of valid cases
for the use of FTC
- = -
1998 TWA were permitted - = -
2000 Reform of TWA 2000 extended the use of TWA and re-
moved the restrictions concerning unskilled workers
- = -
Notes: Source: OECD (2004), pp.119-120. The equal sign indicates that the change in a sub-item was not large enough to be visible in the overall EPL index ; ‘-’ (‘+’)
indicates less (more) protection. Empty fields are also empty in the original source.
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Break points of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indices, continued.
Reform description EPL overall EPL regular contracts EPL temp. contracts
Japan 1985 TWA were permitted for 13 occupations only
1996 The use of TWA was extended to 26 occupations - = -
1999 The use of TWA was extended to all occupations with
some exclusions
- = -
Korea 1998 TWA were liberalized - = -
1998 Dismissals for managerial reasons are allowed (i.e. re-
dundancy and economic restructuring). Whereas this new
law may be used for dismissing a single person for urgent
business needs, it was mainly introduced with collective
dismissals in mind
- - =
Mexico No changes
Netherlands 1999 The flexibility and security law increased the maximum
possible number of FCT and lengthened the maximum
total duration of contracts with TWA
- = -
2001 The EU directive on fixed-term work came into effect re-
ducing the maximum total duration of TWA contracts
= = =
New Zealand 2000 Employment relations act tightened the legislation on in-
dividual and collective dismissals
+ + =
2000 Employment relations act also tightened the legislation
on FTC and TWA
+ = +
Norway 1995 TWA legislation was eased - = -
2000 TWA legislation was further eased - = -
Poland 2002 The new labour code lifted some restrictions in the use
of FTC (from 2 renewals permitted to unlimited – until
accession)
- = -
2003 A new law tightened regulations on temporary work agen-
cies limiting the cases when TWA contracts are allowed
and reducing their maximum total duration
+ = +
Poland 2002 The new labour code lifted some restrictions in the use
of FTC (from 2 renewals permitted to unlimited – until
accession)
- = -
2003 A new law tightened regulations on temporary work agen-
cies limiting the cases when TWA contracts are allowed
and reducing their maximum total duration
+ = +
Portugal 1989 Firing restrictions were eased (dismissals for individual
redundancy were authorised)
1991 Firing restrictions were eased further (dismissals for un-
suitability were authorised)
- - =
1996 A strategic social plan between social partners was agreed
to widen the use of FTC and TWA
- = -
2004 New Labour Code came into force in December 2003 - = -
Slovak Republic 2003 A mew Labour code was approved that relaxed regula-
tions on dismissal of regular contract employees and col-
lective dismissals
- - =
2003 The new Labour code also increased valid cases for FTC,
raised the number of possible renewals and the maximum
overall duration of FTC
- = -
Spain 1984 Restrictions for FTC were substantially relaxed
1994 Procedural requirements for dismissals for economic rea-
sons were relaxed, notice periods shortened
- - =
1994 Rules governing renewals of FTC were tightened and tem-
porary work agencies permitted
- = -
1997 Maximum compensation for unfair dismissal was reduced
and some changes were made to the definition of fair dis-
missal
- - =
2001 Law 12/2001 tightened the rules governing valid cases for
the use of FTC
+ = +
Sweden 1993 TWA were permitted - = -
1997 FTC were made possible without objective reason - = -
Switzerland No changes
Turkey No changes
Great Britain 1985 The period of service to claim unfair dismissal increased
to 2 years
2000 Trial period was halved + + =
2002 Maximum total duration of FTC was reduced to 4 years
(from unlimited)
= = +
United States No changes
Notes: Source: OECD (2004), pp.119-120. The equal sign indicates that the change in a sub-item was not large enough to be visible in the overall EPL index ; ‘-’ (‘+’)
indicates less (more) protection. Empty fields are also empty in the original source.
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics and data sources
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition Source
Employment protection regular 401 2.19 0.96 0.17 5.00 Index from (0) to (5) OECD (2004)
Employment protection temporary 401 2.19 1.59 0.25 5.38 Index from (0) to (5) OECD (2004)
Globalization, overall index 401 73.01 12.04 41.46 93.21 Indicator from (0) to (100) Dreher (2006)
Economic globalization 401 73.49 12.47 37.75 96.04 Indicator from (0) to (100) Dreher (2006)
Political globalization 401 79.93 12.95 39.41 99.00 Indicator from (0) to (100) Dreher (2006)
Social globalization 401 67.86 16.93 19.83 92.04 Indicator from (0) to (100) Dreher (2006)
Log GDP 401 9.88 0.35 8.54 10.46 National income World Bank (2009)
Unemployment rate 401 8.43 4.08 1.60 23.90 Share of unemployed in active population OECD (2009)
Log unemployment spending 401 0.11 0.80 -2.30 1.67 Unemployment spending as share of GDP OECD (2009)
Union density 342 38.48 21.01 8.20 83.86 Percentage of union members in dependent workforce Dreher and Gaston (2005)
5-year GDP growth 401 0.11 0.09 -0.16 0.51 (GDP – GDP(-5))/ GDP(-5)
Left-wing government 401 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 Dummy variable. Beck et al. (2001)
Right-wing government 401 0.26 0.36 -0.57 1.00 Continuous measure Bjørnskov (2008)
Notes: based on regression sample of Tables 1, 2 and 13 (union density).
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Table 9: Globalization and protection of regularly employed, 1985-2003, parsimonious model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) -0.351*** -0.369*** -0.400*** -0.348*** -0.369***
[2.94] [3.11] [3.36] [2.85] [3.03]
Log Population (-2) 1.186*** 1.152*** 1.282*** 1.610*** 1.455***
[3.35] [3.26] [3.68] [4.60] [4.04]
Globalization, overall (-2) -0.015***
[5.09]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.011*** -0.012***
[5.07] [5.24]
Political glob. (-2) -0.004** -0.004**
[2.38] [2.43]
Social glob. (-2) -0.002 -0.004**
[1.37] [2.27]
Constant -7.616* -6,789 -8.508* -13.684*** -11.613**
[1.65] [1.47] [1.87] [3.02] [2.49]
Observations 480 480 480 480 480
Number of countries 28 28 28 28 28
R-squared (within) 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.14
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and
year fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Table 10: Globalization and protection of atypically employed, 1985-2003, parsimonious model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) 0.935*** 0.888*** 0.974*** 0.910*** 0.951***
[3.12] [2.97] [3.21] [3.01] [3.18]
Log Population (-2) 7.221*** 7.110*** 6.399*** 6.530*** 7.205***
[8.11] [7.97] [7.19] [7.53] [8.16]
Globalization, overall (-2) 0.025***
[3.41]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.004 -0.002
[0.77] [0.31]
Political glob. (-2) 0.008** 0.010**
[2.01] [2.41]
Social glob. (-2) 0.016*** 0.016***
[3.56] [3.73]
Constant -97.718*** -95.419*** -85.818*** -87.842*** -96.917***
[8.43] [8.19] [7.39] [7.83] [8.47]
Observations 480 480 480 480 480
Number of countries 28 28 28 28 28
R-squared (within) 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.35
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for atypically employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and
year fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 11: Globalization and protection of regularly employed, 1985-2003, OECD countries with no com-
munist past
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) -0.512 -0.498 -0.802** -0.865*** -1.070***
[1.51] [1.51] [2.53] [2.71] [3.21]
Log Population (-2) 2.360*** 2.623*** 2.540*** 2.793*** 2.668***
[5.84] [6.52] [6.38] [6.98] [6.33]
Unemployment rate (-2) 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.000 0.002
[0.82] [1.18] [1.34] [0.04] [0.31]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.074** -0.073** -0.101*** -0.056 -0.082**
[2.16] [2.11] [2.92] [1.57] [2.32]
GDP growth (-2) 0.022 0.025 0.038** 0.041** 0.048***
[1.23] [1.45] [2.22] [2.38] [2.68]
Left-wing govt. (-2) 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.043** 0.057*** 0.045**
[2.62] [2.88] [2.15] [2.74] [2.14]
Globalization, overall (-2) -0.017***
[4.39]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.013*** -0.012***
[4.93] [4.40]
Political glob. (-2) -0.008*** -0.007***
[4.25] [3.64]
Social glob. (-2) 0.000 -0.001
[0.11] [0.43]
Constant -20.768*** -23.794*** -20.705*** -23.366*** -20.477***
[3.73] [4.32] [3.72] [4.13] [3.56]
Observations 370 370 370 370 370
Number of countries 22 22 22 22 22
R-squared (within) 0.32 0.36 0.32 0.31 0.28
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and
year fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 12: Globalization and protection of atypically employed, 1985-2003, OECD countries with no com-
munist past
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) 2.252** 2.306** 3.752*** 2.990*** 2.248**
[2.45] [2.57] [4.32] [3.46] [2.59]
Log Population (-2) 9.343*** 9.579*** 8.469*** 8.536*** 9.893***
[8.51] [8.74] [7.76] [7.87] [9.01]
Unemployment rate (-2) 0.000 0.012 0.014 0.009 0.003
[0.00] [0.74] [0.79] [0.52] [0.18]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.114 -0.159* -0.120 -0.143 -0.105
[1.22] [1.69] [1.27] [1.49] [1.13]
GDP growth (-2) -0.040 -0.036 -0.110** -0.078* -0.033
[0.82] [0.75] [2.36] [1.69] [0.69]
Left-wing govt. (-2) 0.058 0.052 0.075 0.055 0.068
[1.05] [0.95] [1.34] [0.97] [1.26]
Globalization, overall (-2) 0.032***
[3.08]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.013* -0.013*
[1.83] [1.81]
Political glob. (-2) 0.009* 0.012**
[1.71] [2.22]
Social glob. (-2) 0.024*** 0.025***
[4.26] [4.33]
Constant -133.681*** -136.404*** -133.798*** -129.395*** -139.832***
[8.84] [9.09] [8.77] [8.43] [9.34]
Observations 370 370 370 370 370
Number of countries 22 22 22 22 22
R-squared (within) 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.43 0.46
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for atypically employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and
year fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 13: Globalization and protection of regularly employed, 1985-2003, controlling for union density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) -0.990*** -0.966** -1.255*** -1.474*** -1.517***
[2.66] [2.59] [3.24] [4.01] [4.00]
Log Population (-2) 1.661*** 1.971*** 2.330*** 2.547*** 1.940***
[3.64] [4.17] [5.11] [5.69] [3.88]
Unemployment rate (-2) 0.008 0.006 0.008 -0.002 0.004
[1.29] [0.93] [1.19] [0.32] [0.55]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.037 -0.021 -0.079** -0.008 -0.054
[1.13] [0.61] [2.26] [0.23] [1.55]
Union density (-2) -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.016***
[6.34] [5.46] [4.19] [5.66] [5.62]
GDP growth (-2) 0.047** 0.046** 0.053** 0.067*** 0.067***
[2.35] [2.29] [2.55] [3.35] [3.29]
Right-wing govt., continuous (-2) -0.129*** -0.132*** -0.094*** -0.113*** -0.101***
[4.08] [4.19] [2.92] [3.52] [3.08]
Globalization, overall (-2) -0.025***
[6.27]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.010*** -0.011***
[3.33] [3.73]
Political glob. (-2) -0.011*** -0.010***
[5.23] [4.89]
Social glob. (-2) -0.006** -0.007***
[2.32] [2.72]
Constant -6,736 -10,592 -13.459* -13.917** -6,540
[0.98] [1.49] [1.89] [1.99] [0.88]
Observations 342 342 342 342 342
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20
R-squared (within) 0.42 0.43 0.37 0.39 0.36
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for regularly employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and
year fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 14: Globalization and protection of atypically employed, 1985-2003, controlling for union density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP (-2) 2.401** 3.012*** 3.709*** 3.060*** 2.725***
[2.29] [2.93] [3.50] [3.02] [2.72]
Log Population (-2) 10.171*** 11.140*** 8.927*** 8.971*** 11.115***
[7.94] [8.56] [7.16] [7.27] [8.40]
Unemployment rate (-2) -0.008 0.005 0.007 0.005 -0.009
[0.48] [0.31] [0.39] [0.29] [0.50]
Log unemployment spending (-2) -0.098 -0.195** -0.089 -0.136 -0.085
[1.05] [2.04] [0.93] [1.40] [0.92]
Union density (-2) -0.006 0.008 -0.008 -0.008 0.000
[0.79] [1.00] [1.10] [1.09] [0.05]
GDP growth (-2) -0.076 -0.112** -0.128** -0.103* -0.092*
[1.37] [2.05] [2.25] [1.88] [1.71]
Right-wing govt., continuous (-2) 0.122 0.156* 0.059 0.100 0.120
[1.38] [1.80] [0.67] [1.13] [1.38]
Globalization, overall (-2) 0.034***
[3.03]
Economic glob. (-2) -0.019** -0.010
[2.28] [1.23]
Political glob. (-2) 0.015*** 0.014**
[2.70] [2.38]
Social glob. (-2) 0.032*** 0.027***
[4.56] [3.91]
Constant -144.429*** -161.662*** -138.408*** -134.717*** -158.295***
[7.47] [8.27] [7.11] [6.97] [8.01]
Observations 342 342 342 342 342
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20
R-squared (within) 0.46 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.47
Notes: Dependent variable is the Employment Protection Index for atypically employed workers (OECD, 2004), ranging from 0 to 6. OLS estimation with country and
year fixed effects (not reported). Globalization is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (Dreher, 2006). Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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